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THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIRE
Robert Holyer

In this essay I offer a reformulation and defense of the argument from desire as it is
presented in the works of C. S. Lewis. Specifically, I try to answer the criticisms of the
argument made by John Beversluis in his recent book C. S. Lewis and the Search for
Rational Religion. However, my concern is not so much Lewis as it is the argument
itself, which I argue is worthy of serious and more extended philosophical treatment.

In his critical discussion of C. S. Lewis's case for Christianity, John Beversluis
extracts from Lewis's writings something he calls the argument from desire. I
Although Lewis himself never presented it as a philosophical argument, he did
insinuate it at several points in his writings, especially in the autobiographical
works, The Pilgrim's Regress and Surprised by Joy, and it was arguably the
most important consideration in his own conversion. What Beversluis does is to
present this facet of Lewis's development as a philosophical argument, which
he then goes on to reject for both "logical and theological" reasons. In what
follows I shall consider Lewis's argument only from a philosophical point of
view. My intention is to reformulate and defend it, and this not primarily to
vindicate Lewis from what I think are some superficial criticisms (though I hope
that what I have to say will have this effect), but more importantly, because I
think Lewis offers us in rough form an argument from religious experience that
is both different from the one that is most commonly discussed and deserving
of a more careful philosophical treatment than it receives from Beversluis.
The argument from desire comprises several insights Lewis came to over the
years that enabled him to understand one of the central concerns of his life, the
experience of what he called Joy. What Lewis called Joy, and what others have
called Sehnsucht (a term Lewis himself used), melancholy, ecstatic wonder or
romantic longing, is not easy to describe; in essence, it is an intense longing or
desire which, though unsatisfied, "is itself more desirable than any other satisfaction."2 Because it is unsatisfied, "it might almost equally well be called a particular
kind of unhappiness or grief."3 So there are in effect two essential elements of
Joy: a sort of rapturous desire and a sense of being separated or alienated from
the object of desire. Lewis, of course, was not alone in the attention he devoted
to these feelings. If Corbin Scott Carnell is correct, they "may be said to represent
just as much a basic theme in literature as love . . ."4
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For my purpose, what is most interesting about Joy is that it is in no obvious
sense religious. To be sure, the sort of desire that is part of Joy is also one of
the constituent elements of the experience of the holy, the one Rudolf Otto
identified as fascination. 5 However, Joy lacks precisely what Otto regarded as
essential to the holy, and that is a sense of the divine presence. As Lewis
described it, Joy is not an awareness of God's presence; it is simply an unfulfilled
desire, and it is not in any obvious sense a desire for God. What is more, it can
be experienced along with, and is in some sense similar to, some other desires,
such as the desire for beauty, sexual desire and romantic love; and consequently,
it is often difficult to distinguish it from them. Also, whatever the object of Joy
is, it is not something given in our experience. The conclusion reached by many
who have experienced it is that it is a desire for that which lies beyond what we
now experience, a desire for an unknown but ultimately satisfying something.
Lewis himself experienced Joy for a number of years before he came to believe
that it has any theological import. In fact, to discover what it was a desire for
was the substance of his spiritual search. However, though Joy may be mixed
in with our other desires and difficult to distinguish from them, it is a distinct
desire: it is not just a desire for an ultimate degree of satisfaction of our other
desires.
The insights Lewis came to in his quest for Joy may be summarized by three
arguments which together constitute the argument from desire. 6
Since all natural' desires are desires for an object that satisfies them,
Joy is a desire for some object.
2 Joy is not a desire for any finite object, since no finite object satisfies
it.
3

Since all desires have existents that satsify them, Joy too has an
existent which satisfies it. Therefore, (combined with 2) an infinite
object exists.

To examine the argument and Beversluis's objections to it, I shaH consider each
component in tum.
Although 1 came as something of a discovery to Lewis, Beversluis accepts it
simply as "an observation about the nature of desire." (16) What he means by
this is not immediately clear. Apparently he accepts it only as a definitional
truth: what we call a desire is always a desire for something. Accordingly 1 is
simply a statement of how we use the term desire correctly: it needs an object.
However, Beversluis argues, we cannot draw any existential conclusions from
this "grammatical" truism.
Although this is certainly correct, it misses Lewis's point completely. Lewis
well knew that all desires have objects in the grammatical sense. The real issue
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for him was something else. One of the mistakes he discovered in his own
experience was the belief that Joy was a desire for the experience of Joy, that
it was quite simply a desire for a certain state of mind. If we look closely at the
nature of Joy it is easy to see how Lewis made this mistake. If it is an unsatisfied
desire which is itself desirable, it would easily seem that what is desirable is the
state of having the desire aroused but unsatisfied. The conviction Lewis came
to through his reading of Samuel Alexander's Space, Time and Deity was that
all desires are desires for some external object that satisfies them. Consequently,
Joy too must be a desire for some external object and not for a state of mind.
Accordingly, we would have to replace 1 with
1'

Since all natural desires are desires for an external object that disatisfies them, Joy too is a desire for some external object.

Although l' better captures Lewis's point and what is necessary for the argument
from desire, it is not at all clear that its major premiss, All desires are desires
for some external object, is true. There are many examples of desires that seem
to be desires for a certain state of mind. I should think that some people who
take drugs or get drunk do so desiring a certain state of mind. Presumably, many
people seek professional psychological care, hoping to achieve a specific state
of mind. And in everyday speech we can find many sentences that seem to
indicate a desire for a certain state of mind-for example, many people claim
that they want peace of mind. Moreover, it is not at all clear that desires are
only desires for certain external objects. They are more commonly a desire both
for some external state of affairs and also for some state of mind which should
result from it. The man who is hungry, for example, desires not only food but
the cessation of hunger pains because he has eaten. In fact, only if the pains
cease after eating are we convinced that he was hungry. As we shall see in
discussion of 2, this is a crucial issue for Lewis.
In light of this, we should perhaps replace l' by
1"

Since all natural desires are desires both for some external object
and a corresponding mental state that results from it, Joy is a desire
both for an external object and a corresponding mental state that is
the result of it.

Although there are still some ambiguities in 1", I think some further refinement
of it will serve not only to articulate Lewis's insights, but also to accommodate
the objections that can be raised to 1. It is certainly debatable that the desire for
a drug-induced state of mind is a "natural" desire; even if it is, it could be argued
that it does not deny the major premiss of 1" since drugs produce their effects
by altering our perceptions of external states of affairs. And of the many cases
where we seem to desire a certain state of mind, it could be argued that what
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we really desire is a state of mind that we should have as the result of an existing
state of affairs, but do not. In other words, I should think that some version of
I" might be defensible.
However, Lewis's remarks are subject to another interpretation, and it may
well be that what his argument requires is nothing as universal as the major
premiss of I". Perhaps all Lewis claimed~ and all that is needed is
1'"

Joy is either a desire for a state of mind or for an external object.
Since it is not desire for a state of mind, it is a desire for an external
object.

I know of no objection to the major premiss. I suspect the most important question
would be how one could establish the minor premiss. Lewis claimed that he had
come to know it on the basis of experience, in particular his failure to find that
the experience of Joy fulfilled his desire. This of course raises all the issues
raised by 2, since the evidence Lewis had for 2 was of a piece with the evidence
he had for the minor premiss of 1"'. So it is to an examination of 2 that we are
naturally led. Suffice it to say that if 2 is true, so is the minor premiss of 1"'.
The concerns that lie behind 2 become relevant once one accepts some version
of 1. That is, if Joy is a desire for something, even in the grammatical sense,
the next appropriate question is a desire for what. Lewis sought to answer this
on the basis of experience. He attempted to satisfy his desire by appropriating
those objects that seemed to evoke it. What he claimed to discover was that
none of the objects that evoked the desire actually satisfied it. In other words,
though the objects that evoked Joy may have satisfied some desire, they did not
satisfy the desire he called Joy. Consequently, Lewis claimed to come to know
2 by a process of elimination in which he tried any likely means of satisfying
his desire only to find that none of them sufficed.
Though Beversluis sees the plausibility of Lewis's case, he does not think
that Lewis has given us a satisfactory account of how we can sort out our desires
to determine their real objects. He observes:
Lewis thought that anyone who took these experiences seriously and
pursued each object of desire would discover that they do not ultimately
satisfy. And from this he concluded without further ado that they are
not what we really want. (16)
Having summarized what he takes to be Lewis's view, he then rejects it, arguing
this.
The claim Anything that does not ultimately satisfy us cannot be what
we really wanted may sound plausible when stated in so general a way,
but it cannot survive the test of concrete examples. Would anyone
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seriously want to argue that the fact that Sam is hungry again four hours
after breakfast proves that it is not food that he really wanted? Or that
the fact that Jill is tired by 10:00 a.m. proves that it was not sleep that
she really wanted? How, then, can such a conclusion follow in the case
of our experiences of Joy? Why say that the failure of music or poetry
to satisfy us fully proves that they are not really what we want? (16)
Beversluis's argument is surely correct, and if he accurately summarizes Lewis's
views, he has certainly put his finger on a major blunder. However, I doubt that
he is giving us a faithful reading of Lewis. No doubt, you can find statements
in Lewis that come close to: if x does not ultimately satisfy S, then x is not what
S really wanted. However, I think Lewis summarizes his view more accurately
when he says, "Do what we will, then, we remain conscious of a desire which
no natural happiness will satisfy. "9 What this suggests and what his examples
bear out is the claim that finite objects satisfy some of our desires (those whose
combined satisfaction he might call "natural happiness") without satisfying Joy.
In other words, that x does not satisfy S's desire for Joy means x is not the object
of Joy. This is perfectly consistent with the claim that x may satisfy some of
S's other desires, and it does not entail the erroneous proposition that Beversluis
attributes to Lewis. So I fail to see that Lewis is guilty of quite the blunder
Beversluis attributes to him.
But suppose he were. Suppose he gave us an erroneous account of the criteria
for making judgments like 2, or suppose (as I think to be the case) that he offers
us no account of the criteria. What important conclusions follow? What really
is Beversluis's point? Is it that Lewis was wrong to claim that we can sift through
our desires and find their true objects? But obviously we do. Those who wish
to lose weight, for example, must often determine whether their desire for food
is really hunger or something else. And a man and a woman contemplating
marriage would be wise to come to some understanding of the real nature of the
desire they have for one another. These sorts of judgments are not always easy
to make, but we do make them. Or is Beversluis's point that the evidence we
should consult in making them is something other than the satisfactions we
experience? But surely satisfactions are important evidence, though perhaps not
in the simple way he pillories. So, for example, while it is not the case that
Sam's hunger four hours after breakfast proves that he was not really hungry,
his hunger one hour after what is for him a normal-sized breakfast is prima facie
evidence that his desire for food is something other than hunger. And of course
satisfactions may not be the only evidence to consider. Lewis several times refers
to what he thought about the possible objects of Joy, and if we were to tease
out of his highly metaphorical descriptions a set of criteria for making for 2, it
would not be difficult to find more than Beversluis did. But admitting that we
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do not find in Lewis an adequate account of the relevant criteria 2, perhaps
Beversluis's point is that Lewis, or anyone else, cannot possibly know 2 without
giving such an account. If this is his point, I fail to find it very convincing. A
man's failure to give a satisfactory account of how we come to our perceptual
beliefs is surely no reason to impugn his claim to know, say, that he is sitting
in the library. Analogously, I see nothing in the absence of a satisfactory account
of how we come to judgments like 2 that would impugn Lewis's (or anyone
else's) claim to know it.
But it may be that Beversluis's objection lies elsewhere. Perhaps what he is
driving at is this. Joy is not a desire for a distinct kind of satisfaction: it is merely
the desire for a whole number of things which taken together are ultimately and
completely satisfying. In other words, Joy is not a desire for an infinite object,
but for a sum total of finite objects-what is better called a desire for a completely
satisfying life. Thus, the fact that some finite object is not in itself ultimately
satisfying is not to say that it is not part of what is. If this is so, then we can
admit the reality of Joy but deny that it suggests any theological conclusions.
While I do not know that this is Beversluis's point, it is an important objection
and must be addressed.
The response to it that is most faithful to Lewis's thought is to say that we
learn through experience that Joy is simply not the desire for a sum total satisfaction of our other desires. In the passage I quoted above (p. ???) Lewis drew
a distinction between Joy and what he called a desire for "natural happiness,"
claiming that we know by experience that the two are distinct. Lewis's response,
then, would seem to be that the experience of Joy itself, if carefully attended
to, will convince us that it is not simply a desire for a sum total satisfaction of
our other desires. However, though I do not think Lewis would, one may well
accept the claim about the nature of Joy without sacrificing the argument. Insofar
as the objection recognizes Joy as an identifiable desire, it seems to concede the
point that as a desire for an ultimately satisfying life it is distinct from the specific
desires for specific parts of that life. Moreover, though the theological conclusions
do not follow as immediately, one could recast the argument to show that a life
of ultimate happiness requires a God. In this case 2 would have to give way to
2'

Joy is not a desire for a single object, but for ultimate happiness.
However, since ultimate happiness is not possible without a God,
Joy is in a sense also a desire for God.

Of course, 2' would need further support. My intent is not to offer that support,
but simply to suggest that, given the two options I have sketched, the objection
need not undermine 2.
A final possibility is that Beversluis' s point is simply that Lewis has not proven
2. But, so far as I know, he never claimed to. What he claimed was that it is

THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIRE

67

true and that he had come to know it by sorting through his desires. Beyond
this, he offers us the assurance that we too will come to know it if we will put
it to the test as he did. What is more, Lewis was not alone in making these
claims; if we consult others who have written about their experiences of Joy,
we find that many of them also claim to know 2.10 And apart from possibly
pointing out an ambiguity, Beversluis offers us nothing that should lead us to
believe that Lewis and others do not know 2. Consequently, what I offer in
support of 2 shall consist only of two observations about the sort of evidence
relevant to it. First, by the nature of the claim, it would seem that the most
impOliant evidence for it (or against it) is first-person experience. To be in the
best position to verify 2, one would have to have experiences of Joy and also
attempt to satisfy them. In this sense, one's evaluation of 2 would be very much
person-related, which is perhaps a feature common to arguments from religious
experience, not a peculiarity of the argument from desire. And of course, insofar
as one's experience tends to disconfirm 2 the argument from desire may become
an argument against the existence of God. Then again, Lewis does not offer the
argument from desire as person-related in the sense that he thought 2 was true
only for certain kinds of people. His claim for 2 is that we will discover its truth
experientially. In this sense he claims a certain universality for 2: it can and
should be verified by anyone who will honestly put it to the test. But this does
not mean it can be verified by argument, and perhaps one of the reasons Lewis
never presented the argument from desire as a philosophical proof was that he
recognized that a crucial part of it could not be established argumentatively.
Perhaps the best way of convincing someone of 2 is to help him clarify his
experiences of Joy, and it is something like this that Lewis had in mind in
Surprised by Joy and why Beversluis is correct to seein this work an "implicit
argument" and "apologetic implications." Second, given that people other than
Lewis claim to know 2, would it be appropriate for someone to accept it largely
on the basis of testimony? Certainly we do accept judgments like it on that basis.
For example, it is often said that money will not bring happiness, and some
people choose a certain way of life because they have accepted this on the
testimony of others. And we generally think that they are wise to do so. In fact,
the whole wisdom tradition is based on the acceptance of judgments like 2 based
initially at least on testimony. Of course all relevant kinds of testimony should
be considered. But, recognizing the complexity here, I see no reason why in
principle testimony is not good evidence for or against 2, and no reason why
the argument from desire should lack some cogency for one who has little
first-hand experience of Joy.
Considering the argument from desire as a whole, 3 is perhaps the most crucial
part, and it is here that Beversluis focuses most of his philosophical criticism.
If we combine 3 with the results of 2 we can cast the argument in standard form
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as follows:
3a All natural desires have existing objects that they are desires for.
3b Joy is a natural desire for an infinite object.
3c Therefore, an infinite object exists.
The point of Beversluis's attack is the truth of the major premiss, which he
denies for two different reasons.
First, he apparently construes Lewis's argument as a deductive argument, the
major premiss of which is a universal affirmative proposition. However, he asks,
"How could Lewis know that every natural desire has a real object before knowing
that Joy has one?" (19) In other words, he asserts that we could never know 3a
unless we also knew 3c, and if we know 3c why do we need an argument with
it as a conclusion? The only justification for 3a that Beversluis can find in Lewis's
writings is the claim that "Nature does nothing in vain." And the only justification
he can find for this is a theory of natural law. So he concludes: "It begins to
look as if Lewis arrived at his belief that every natural desire has a real object
on the basis of nonempirical considerations, that he has smuggled into his argument a covert metaphysical theory of desire about which we have not been
informed." (19)
Beversluis is indeed correct; 3 does fail as a deductive argument. What he
fails to consider is that it may very well succeed as an inductive argument. If
we know that 3a is true of all natural desires except Joy (in which case it would
be amended to read "Most" rather than "All"), if we do not know that Joy does
not have an object, and if 3b is the case, then we have an inductive argument
that renders 3c highly probable. It is understandable that Beversluis should miss
this possibility, for Lewis often speaks as though we could establish 3a the same
way we establish 3c, arguing from the existence of a desire to the existence of
an object that satisfies it. And Beversluis is again correct in his criticism: the
fact that we are hungry does nothing by itself to establish the conclusion that
there is food. However. if we know empirically (as indeed we do) that food
exists and that it satisfies hunger, and if we know this of all other desires as
well, we have a strong inductive argument for 3c. In other words, I fail to see
that the fallacious principal, the existence of a desire proves that there exists
some object to satisfy it, is at all necessary to Lewis's argument. In fact, I am
arguing it can survive nicely without it.
The second criticism that Beversluis levels at 3c is the observation that not
all natural desires have existing objects that satisfy them. Though in general
food satisfies hungers, there are many people who never have sufficient food.
Here Lewis adds a helpful qualification, claiming in effect that it is not the case
that every actual natural desire has an object that satisfies it, but that for every
type of desire there is an existing type of object that satisfies it. In other words,
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the crucial relationship for 3a is between, say, hunger and food, not between
actual instances of hunger and actual instances of eating. Accordingly, we should
perhaps replace 3a with
3a'

For any type of natural desire there is a class of real objects that
satisfy it.

and 3b with
3b'

Joy is a type of natural desire for an infinite object.

Beversluis makes very little of this qualification, but it suffices to save the
argument from an obvious objection.
However, though 3a' is not obviously false in the sense in which 3a is, is it
true? Most of our desires would seem to confirm it. The challenge would be to
look carefully at those desires that apparently do not. For example, do we have
a desire for perfection and is this a type of desire in the relevant sense? Here
we would get into some murky waters. For example, is the desire for perfection
a distinct type of desire or merely a quality of other types of desire? I am inclined
to think that it is the latter, for in most cases our desire for perfection is a desire
for something that perfectly satisfies some other desire-for example, the perfect
meal. But if it is a distinct desire, do we find objects that satisfy it? Apparently
there are perfect proofs, but so far nothing you could call the perfect society or
the perfect cantata. Obviously there is a great deal more that needs to be said
about our desire for perfection, and there are other possible exceptions to 3a',
for example, the desire for immortality. My point is simply that the way to
weaken 3 as an inductive argument is to show that there are such exceptions.
However, even if these exceptions exist, they do not disprove 3 but merely
weaken it. And given the number of cases that seem to confirm it, I doubt that,
even in weakening it, the challenger would be able to empty it of all force.
So far as I can tell, the only other way to weaken 3 is to challenge 3b': is
Joy a natural desire sufficiently like other desires? Here two distinct issues could
be raised. First, how widespread does the experience of Joy have to be in order
to qualify as a natural desire? This would be a difficult challenge to sustain or
to meet, since one can have only a very impressionistic sense of how widespread
this desire actually is. But if Carnell is correct to claim that it is as basic a theme
in literature as love, it is difficult to believe that this sort of challenge has much
chance of success. Second, one could question the extent to which Joy is like
other natural desires. Perhaps a challenger could argue that the fact that Joy is
desirable even though it is unfulfilled is a feature that makes it significantly
unlike other desires. However, even if the challenger has some success with this
line of argument, the most he could do is to diminish the similarity between Joy
and other natural desires and hence weaken the argument. The fact that it is still
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a desire, albeit of a somewhat different sort, would seem to limit the extent to
which this sort of challenge could vitiate the argument.
If my analysis is correct, the argument from desire may survive as an inductive
argument of indeterminate force (maybe what Lewis called "a pretty good indication") for one who knows 2 or thinks it probable either on the basis of first-hand
ex.perience or testimony. In many ways 2 is the crucial part of the argument.
What I have argued is that Beversluis has not offered us good reasons to impugn
claims to know it. An appropriate challenge of it would consist of a significantly
different interpretation of the experience of Joy, one that denied it any theological
force whatsoever. Though 3 can be challenged on a number of fronts, I think
there are limits to how successful the challenges can be.

Arkansas College

NOTES
1. John Beversluis. C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion (Grand Rapids, Michigan:
Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1985), pp. 8-31. Further citations of this work will be in parenthesis in the text.
2. C. S. Lewis,Surprised by Joy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1955), p. 18.
3. Ihid.
4. Corbin Scott Cornell, Bright Shadow of Reality (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans,
1974), p. 23.
5. Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, second edition, tr. John W. Harvey (New York: Oxford U.
P., 1958), pp. 34-36.

6. Beversluis claims to find two significantly different versions of the argument, one in Pilgrim's
Regress and the other in Surprised by Joy. (II, 17) I think they are fundamentally the same. The
only difference Beversluis comes up with is that the version in The Pilgrim's Regress contains a
defense of 3 that is nowhere explicitly stated in Surprised by Joy. However, there is a second and
clearly different version of the argument to be found in Lewis's writings, and this in a letter to his
brother Warren dated 22 November 1931 (W. H. Lewis, ed., Letters ofe. S, Lewis (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1966), p. 144. This version of the argument, similiar to one of
Descartes's versions of the ontological argument, turns on the question of origin and is roughly this.
If we have this "vague desire" for an infinite object, where could we have come by it, unless there
is a God who created it in us?
7. Since "natural" is used variously in philosophical and theological discussions, I should say here
that I use it to describe a desire that is a) non-pathological, b) not a supernatural gift and 3) somewhat
commonly experienced.
8. The crucial passage in Surprised by Joy, pp. 219-220, is not clear, and therefore will bear both
interpretations. Observes Lewis, "Joy itself, considered as an event in my own mind, turned out to
be of no value at all." This may represent a conclusion Lewis came to about Joy independently of
any judgment about all other desires.

THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIRE

71

9. C. S. Lewis, "The Weight of Glory," in The Weight of Glory alld Other Essays, revised edition
(New York: Macmillan, 1980), p. 8.
10. For examples, see Carnell, "p. cit., pp. 13-29.

